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The Major Characteristics of the Period following
September 1931
TheGold Standard (Amendment) Act of September 21,
ended the brief history of the gold bullion standard in
Great Britain. It inaugurated a period during which the
pound sterling declined in terms of the dollar, the franc, and
all other currencies which, through the mechanism of the
international gold standard or otherwise, were kept in an un-
changed and stable relation to these two currencies and to
one another.
The Concept of the Breakup of the Nucleus as opposed to
the Concept of the Depreciation of Sterling
This situation is simply described by saying that the pound
sterling depreciated 'in terms of gold,' or still more simply
that it 'depreciated.' In the use of these terms, which might
be applied equally to the currencies of Peru, Spain, or Aus-
tralia, there is a danger to clear thinking, not because they
do not accurately describe the surface facts, but because they
carry certain implications. To say that sterling has depre-
ciated in terms of gold implies that nothing very serious has
happened to gold as an international monetary standard, and
that the international gold standard system continues to
operate as before, with only the loss of one of its members.
It also implies strongly that stability continues to reside in
gold standard countries, and that instability has taken up its
abiding place in sterling. These implications are avoided by
considering England's abandonment of the gold standard as
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the breakup of the nucleus around which the world's system
of foreign exchange rates clustered.
At the conclusion of our discussion of the effects of the
World War upon the forms of the gold standard, we said
that because of the profound influence of the war upon the
structure of the world's credit system and upon the economic
environment in which it operated, 1914—19 was a period that
marked the breakdown, rather than the suspension or modi-
fication, of the pre-war international gold standard system.'
Because these changes were fundamental and enduring the
hard test of experience proved that there was no true restora-
tion of the system after the war, but merely experimentation
with it to meet a series of emergency situations in the hope
of gradually achieving a genuine return to 'normal.' This
hope proved illusory and the experimentation itself left its
own inheritance. Therefore, when England suspended the
convertibility of sterling in 1931theinternational gold stand-
ard as a world institution entered into an historical phase
which must be described by a stronger term than breakdown.
September 1931markedthe beginning of its disintegration.
This emphasis is not brought out adequately by approaching
the task of interpreting the meaning and describing the con-
sequences of England's suspension of gold payments from the
viewpoint of sterling depreciation 'in gold.' It was in protest
against such an approach that J. M. Keynes uttered his fa-
mous bon mot that sterling had not left gold but that gold
had left sterling. This bon mot, however, plunges into the
opposite error. The simple fact is that the Gold Standard
(Amendment) Act ended a certain system of stable exchange
relationships between the center countries. It did not alter
the basic characteristics of the decentralized post-war world
credit structure. It did not alter the triangular pattern of the
world's exchange markets or end the use of the London mar-
ket as a channel of remittance. It did not convert Great
Britain from a center into a periphery country. It revived
'Cf. Ch. 6, passim.NATURE OF THE DISINTEGRATION 1053
inan acute form the question 'Who is Leader?' in the
currency system. It intensified the struggle for the interna-
tional shifting of economic burdens. We said in Chapter 21
that the period of Restoration was a window through which
the real nature of the problems inherited from the war and
carried forward into the period of the return to gold couki
be seen clearly. England's abandonment of the gold standard
in September 1931halfreopened that window, and through
it could be seen clearly the nature of the problems inherited
from post-war reconstruction. When the United States ]Ieft
thegold standard eighteen months later the window was
opened wide.
The Possible Modes of Behavior of any Foreign
Exchange Triangle
The use of the concept, the Breakup of the Nucleus rather
than Depreciation in Gold, places the relations between the
pound, the franc, and the dollar in the foreground of our
analysis of the period of Disintegration. Together these three
currencies continued to constitute a triangular system of rates
to which other currencies had in some way to adjust them-
selves. In 1933and1934whenthe United States had followed
England 'off' the gold standard the attractions and repulsions
within this triangle were fully revealed in the daily fluctua-
tions in the exchange rates. But they neither began in
1933norended in March 1934. They were of fundamental
importance during Experimentation and continued to be
so during the first years of Disintegration.
From 1931to1934thethree rates that composed the
sterling-dollar-franc triangle exemplified the most important
of the mutual relationships possible in a system of three ex-
change rates. Each rate was subject to many forms of pressure
arising from its position in the central triangle. Each rate,
moreover, formed one leg of many other foreign exchange
triangles of which the other two legs were exchange rates of
countries not members of the central nucleus. The behavior1054 DISINTEGRATION
of these other triangles exemplified the other relationships
possible in a system of exchange rates but not illustrated by
the behavior of the central triangle. Through them the pres-
sures on the central triangle were intensified and multiplied.
It will therefore be helpful, as a preliminary to our discussion
of the Disintegration period, to consider the possible modes
of behavior of any foreign exchange triangle and some of the
forms of pressure to which they may give rise.
It is a fundamental principle that, in a system of three ex-
change rates, only three modes of behavior are possible as
long as exchange arbitrage and remittance from one center
to another through the third center are not prohibited:
i)All three rates may be stable.
2)All three rates may fluctuate in such a manner as to eliminate
the arbitrage profits arising from the movement of any one of
them.
3) One rate may be stable while the other two fluctuate in the
same manner and degree.
In active and well organized markets this is due to the simple
fact that the exchange operator who for any reason wishes to
transfer funds from one market to another has the alternative
of purchasing the currency he wants directly in the market
for it or of buying a third currency and purchasing his re-
quirements with that. He will choose the cheapest method of
remittance, and the cost of remittance from one market to
another by direct or indirect means consequently tends to
become equal. Until it does an arbitrage opportunity is open.
Provided that in at least one of the three markets concerned
speculative transactions in the exchanges are allowed, the
arbitrageur will close the gap.
Under all three possible modes of behavior various forms
of pressure are continually being experienced throughout the
system. If the three rates are to be kept stable these pressures
have to be relieved through the 'corrective forces' described
by orthodox gold standard analysis or by filling in the gaps
in the mutual exchanges between the three countries byNATURE OF THE DISINTEGRATION 1055
credit operations, or by some form of exchange control or
pegging, using that term in its broadest sense to include direct
control over trade and capital movements, or by some combi-
nation of these. The real cost of relieving these pressures will,
when the three currencies are of major importance, be dis-
tributed widely throughout the system, but the whole weight
of our analysis in these studies shows that they will not be
distributed equally.
If none of the rates is fixed, then the pressures will find
partial expression in changes in all three, which will produce
a new dispersion of prices within each of the three countries,
will influence marginal elements in all the items in their
respective balances of payments, and will effect a somewhat
different distribution of the real costs of economic adjustment
throughout the system. If one of the three rates is fixed, the
double fact that the other two are free to move, but that, if
they do move, they must move together, introduces a dif-
ferent set of variables into the process by which the exchange
triangle perpetuates itself as a system of rates. No effort to
establish a fixed ratio between any two of the three
cies, and especially no effort to establish an arbitrary ratio
between them, can be immune to influences affecting their
relations to the third currency. When the three currencies
are all of major importance the resulting position may be
extremely complex. It may be defined by a series of abstract
statements in which the pound, the franc, and the dollar are
used as illustrations. When one rate in this triangle is as-
sumed to be fixed and the other two free, the abstract gen-
cralization is established and can be applied to the two other
possible positions by transposing the currencies in the state-
ment. But since, after 1931, each of the three legs of the
central triangle was in turn the fixed point to which the sys-
tem had to adjust itself, the three possibilities are stated in
full and the reader is not left to apply one illustration, mutatis
mutandi, to the other two:
If the pound is kept stable in terms of the dollar and at the1056 DISINTEGRATION
same time there is a strong tendency for the franc to rise or fall
in terms of the dollar, then this tendency can fully express itself
only if the franc rises or falls in the same degree in terms of the
pound also. Such a movement may not be in harmony with the
basic relations between the franc and the pound. There will be a
compromise result in which the franc rises or falls in terms of
both the dollar and the pound, but comes to rest at a point that
is not appropriate to its fundamental relations to either. If there
is a strong tendency for the franc to rise or fall in terms of the
pound, there will be a similar compromise result. If these rela-
tionships cannot be maintained, then the dollar-sterling stabiliza-
tion must break down. As long as they are maintained there will
be pressures throughout the system that must be relieved by fun-
damental economic adjustments, by credit operations, by ex-
change control, or by some combination of these. Only if there is
a natural tendency for the franc to rise or fall in terms of both
the dollar and the pound will there be no pressure on any of the
three rates in the triangular system that can be attributed di-
rectly to the attempt to keep the dollar-sterling rate stable.
If the pound is kept stable in terms of the franc, and at the
same time there is a strong tendency for the dollar to rise or fall
in terms of the franc, this tendency can express itself fully only if
the dollar rises or falls in terms of the pound also. This may not
be in harmony with the basic relations between the dollar and
the pound, and there will be a compromise result in which the
dollar rises or falls in terms of both the franc and the pound but
comes to rest at a point that is not appropriate to its fundamental
relations to either. If there is a strong tendency for the dollar to
rise or fall in terms of the pound, there will be a similar compro-
mise result. If these relationships cannot be maintained the
sterling-franc stabilization must break down. Only if there is a
natural tendency for the dollar to rise or fall in terms of both the
pound and the franc will there be no pressure on any of the three
rates in the triangular system that can be attributed directly to
the attempt to keep the sterling-franc rate stable.
If the dollar is kept stable in terms of the franc and at the same
time there is a strong tendency for the pound to rise or fall in
terms of the dollar, then this tendency can fully express itself
only if the pound rises or falls in the same degree in terms of theNATURE OF THE DISINTEGRATION 1057
franc also. Such a movement may not be in harmony with the
basic relations between the pound and the franc. There will be a
compromise result in which the pound rises or falls in terms of
both the dollar and the franc but comes to rest at a point that is
not appropriate to its fundamental relations to either. If there is
a strong tendency for the pound to rise or fall in terms of thc
franc there will be a similar compromise result. If these relation-
ships cannot be maintained the dollar-franc stabilization must
break down. Only if there is a natural tendency for the pound to
rise or fall in terms of both the dollar and the franc will there
be no pressure on any of the three rates in the triangular system
that can be attributed directly to the attempt to keep the dollar-
franc rate stable.
Two assumptions are implicit in these statements:
i) The rate that is kept stable in the system is fixed at a point
that is not artificial and that will not itself be likely to set in
motion forces strong enough to break down the stabilization.
2) All three rates are sufficiently important so that the behavior
of any one is an active influence upon the behavior of the
other two.
Either assumption may be untrue. A stabilization in which
one currency was continually on the defensive would result
in a strong tendency for remittance to the stronger partner
in the stabilization from the weaker partner through the
third market. Under- and overvaluation problems, moreover,
cannot be confined to the two countries directly affected, but
by their very nature spread their influence throughout the
system. Stabilization of one leg of the triangle at an artificial
level would be an active force in influencing the common
movement of the other two rates. It is quite clear that a situa-
tion is possible in which neither the common movement of
the two rates free to move nor the figure at which the third
rate is fixed may be appropriate to the basic requirements of
the system as a whole.
It is clear also that the three legs of the triangle are never
of equal importance and that this is an active force in de-1058 DISINTEGRATION
termining the common movement of the two rates that are
free to move. If in the first of the three abstract statements
the Peruvian sol were used illustratively instead of the franc,
it is quite clear that there would be no pressure upon the
dollar-sterling stabilization, whatever the natural tendency
of the sol might be to move either in dollars or in pounds.
The sol-dollãr rate and the sol-pound rate would simply
move together, which might create problems in Peru but not
in Great Britain and the United States. If the Peruvian so!
were substituted for the franc in the second and third of these
abstract statements, their wording would at once appear ab-
surd. It is quite plain that no stabilization between the so!
and the dollar, or between the sol and the pound, would
stand in the way of or seriously modify fluctuations in the
dollar-sterling rate. There would of course be a force exerted,
but it would be far too small to come within the realm of
measurement. If the sol-dollar stabilization were maintained,
then indeed the other two rates, the dollar-sterling and the
sterling-so! rates, would move together, but the sterling-sol
rate would be simply a reflection of the dollar-sterling rate.
Similarly if the sol-pound stabilization were maintained, the
movements of the sol-dollar rate would be simply a reflection
of the movements of the sterling-dollar rate.
The substitution of the sol for the franc in these illustra-
tive cases may have the appearance of a trivial mental exercise
and an unnecessary draft upon the patience of the reader,
but the point it illustrates is not trivial. It calls attention to a
fundamental characteristic of the world's exchange markets
which, under certain circumstances, is entirely obscured by
the use of the term 'depreciation in gold,' and of which it is
necessary to take account in setting out the possible modes of
behavior of any foreign exchange triangle. As shown in other
parts of these studies the channels of international remit-
tance are not all equally free and well marked. Some are
broad and deep, some narrow and lightly traveled. In manyNATURE OF THE DISINTEGRATION 1059
foreign exchange triangles one leg is of infinitely greater im-
portance than the other two. In many others one leg is merely
a cross rate. This does not alter the three alternative modes
off behavior of the three rates but it profoundly alters their
significance and the way in which the pressures within the
system are distributed and resisted. The first alternative—
that all three rates remain stable—no longer means that there
is a mutually determining system that is maintained by a
mutual sharing of the adjustments necessary to resist the
sures arising within it. It means either that one rate is fixed
and constitutes a fixed point of reference upon which the
stabilization of the other two is based, or that two rates are
fixed while the third rate merely records or reflects the
bility of the other two. The third rate in this case is not a
dynamic influence in the system. When, for example, the
ling-dollar rate and the sterling-rupee rate are fixed, the
dollar-rupee rate is fixed also, but the dollar-rupee rate is
a strong influence upon either the sterling-dollar or the ster-
ling-rupee rate. The second alternative—that all three rates
fluctuate—no longer means that the system is kept in balance
by a three sided adjustment. The dollar, the sol, and the
franc may constitute a system of rates, fluctuating in such a
manner as to eliminate arbitrage profits arising from the
movement of any one, but the fluctuations in the sol-franc
and sol-dollar rate do not influence those of the dollar-franc
rate materially. The adjustments by which the system is
closed must be made by the Peruvian exchanges.
In the third alternative—that one rate is fixed—it becomes
a matter of great moment whether the rate that is fixed is or is
not a cross rate. If the rate that is fixed is not a cross rate,
then the movement of the cross rate merely reflects the move-
ment of the third rate in the system. Any attempt to fix a
cross rate, or a rate that is very much the least important of
the three, will meet with great, and in most cases insuperable
obstacles. For illustrative purposes the difficulties of fixingio6o DISINTEGRATION
the dollar-South African pound rate and thereby forcing the
South African pound-pound sterling rate to follow the fluc-
tuations of the dollar-sterling rate may be cited.
The above discussion has been abstract in the literal sense.
It does not fill in the flesh and blood of the world's foreign ex-
change system, which is, indeed, the task of our analysis as a
whole. It does not allow for the intricate interaction of eco-
nomic and financial influence flowing in every direction. It
abstractsfromthe total situation certain aspects of the struc-
ture of the foreign exchange markets that are easily lost sight
of if attention is concentrated upon the relations of each indi-
vidual currency to gold, no matter how startling may be the
transformations in the role of gold as standard or as reserve.
The Major Characteristics of the Central Foreign
Exchange Triangle, 1931—1934
BeforeSeptember 21, 1931theexchange rates of the three
center countries acted according to the first of the three al-
ternative modes of behavior. In Chapter 21 we stressed this
fact by saying that in 1928—29 a temporary union of dis-
cordant elements was established under the general designa-
tion of the gold standard. After September 21, 1931, when
sterling had broken away from this union but the franc and
the dollar were still linked together through gold, the three
rates behaved according to the third alternative. The franc-
dollar rate being fixed, the sterling-dollar and sterling-franc
rates had to move together. This was a fact of vital impor-
tance, for the sterling-dollar and franc-dollar rates were the
most important legs of the triangle, while the dollar-franc
rate had some of the characteristics of a cross rate.2 As long as
the dollar-franc stabilization was maintained the movement
of the sterling-dollar rate had to be a compromise between
the forces playing directly on it and those playing upon the
sterling-franc rate. Since from 1927 to 1931noreally complete
adjustment had been worked out between the three curren-
2Cf.Ch. TheTriangle, 1933—1934—graphically presented.NATURE OF THE DISINTEGRATION 1061
cies, no perfectly satisfactory basis for a new system of rates
could be achieved by a common movement of sterling in both
dollars and francs. A new exchange rate between London and
Paris, for example, calculated to eliminate the problems left
over from the initial undervaluation of the franc in 1927,
was almost certain to require a sterling-dollar rate that would
slightly overcorrect the remaining traces of the initial
valuation of sterling in 1925. A three way adjustment of rates
was the ideal solution of these difficulties, but this was ex•
cluded by the maintenance of the gold standard in France
and America.
Furthermore, as long as the pound was free to move in
terms of both the franc and the dollar, and this movement
was subject to many powerful short run influences, it was
possible that sterling might become substantially undervalued
in terms of both. Because of the unequal importance to the
United States of the sterling-dollar and the dollar-franc rates,
and the unequal importance to France of the sterling-franc
and the dollar-franc rates, such an undervaluation of sterling
was bound to bring pressure upon the dollar-franc stabiliza•
tion. As long as international gold standard arrangements
prevailed in both the United States and France there was a
possibility that a British return to gold at a new and lower
gold content for the pound sterling might perpetuate these
pressures under a new stable system of rates until either they
were in some way absorbed or a new breakdown occurred.
On the other hand, it was also possible that the common
movement of sterling in francs and dollars might come to
rest at a point where the pressures were at a minimum, and
that the basis for a new system of stable rates with maximum
chances of survival might thus be established, because the
dollar-franc stabilization represented a point of reference for
a new sterling stabilization which was itself fairly well adapted
to the existing economic situation.8 In summary it may be
Cf. Ch. i9, The Difficulties attributable to the Return to Gold Itself, and
Ch. 21,ADeclining Price Trend.1062 DISINTEGRATION
said that from September 1931 to April 1933 the central
foreign exchange triangle was unbalanced and not free to
adjust itself, but that it contained a point of reference for a
new set of exchange rates with good chances of long run
survival.4 Such a point of reference was necessary if stable
exchange rates were to be reestablished under gold standard
arrangements except under one condition, namely the estab-
lishment of a new system of gold pars by international agree-
ment. This condition could not be met as long as every major
power returned a different answer to the question, Who is
Sovereign over the Foreign Exchanges?
When the United States left the gold standard in April
1933 it was possible for all three rates in the central triangle
to move, while at the same time preserving a system of mar-
ket equilibrium in accordance with the second of the three
possible modes of behavior. The resulting three-cornered ad-
justment was modified by an effort to keep the franc-sterling
rate stable during the World Economic Conference of
but a three-sided movement of the exchanges was character-
istic of the year when America was 'off gold.' The triangle
was free to adjust itself, and as long as one of the three coun-
tries kept the legal definition of the gold content of its stand-
ard coin unchanged, the international gold standard could be
reestablished and the triangular system fixed in a new pattern,
through the re-definition of the gold content of the standard
coins of the other two.6
When the United States revalued the dollar in January
1934 and reestablished the mechanism of the international
gold standard between the United States and France, then the
three exchanges were once more obliged to follow the third
alternative. The dollar-franc rate was again stable and the
4Cf. Ch. TheTriangle in 1932,Unbalancedbut provided with a Point of
Reference for Future Stabilization.
Cf. Ch. 8, An Abstract Conception of Goldan International Monetary
Standard, Ch. 33, The World Economic Conference, and Ch. Sir' The Price of
Gold.
6Cf. Ch. 33, The Triangle, Boundand Free.NATURE OF THE DISINTEGRATION 1063
dollar-sterling and sterling-franc rates had to move together.
The position, however, of September 1931 to April 1933 was
not restored. The pressures spread throughout the system by
the fact that the most important rates in the central triangle
were forced to move together because the least important rate
was fixed were at that time greatly increased because a wholly
artificial and arbitrary level was chosen for fixing that rate.
The central foreign exchange triangle was again unbalanced
and not free to adjust itself, but an entirely new situation had
been created because an uneconomic ratio had been substi-
tuted for a point of reference available for a new stabilization
of the system.7
In this summary of the changing characteristics of the
sterling-dollar-franc triangle these currencies have been spo-
ken of as if they were merely single currencies and their posi-
tion in the world system of exchange rates has been ignored
in order to bring out the central features in their mutual
relations. Each leg of the triangle, however, as stated above,
was part of many other foreign exchange triangles. The dollar-
sterling-sol, the sterling-dollar-South African pound, and the
sterling-rupee-dollar triangles have been cited as illustrations
in which the dollar-sterling rate was the dominant influence.
In each individual triangle of this type, the behavior of the
cross rates or of the less important rates had little effect upon
the dollar-sterling rate, but it had some effect. The joint effect
of all the foreign exchange triangles in which the dollar-ster-
ling rate was the dominant member, upon the dollar-sterling
rate, and therefore upon its position in the central foreign
exchange triangle was, therefore, not negligible. Similar state-
ments could be made concerning the foreign exchange trian-
gles of which the sterling-franc rate was the most important
member after the United States left the gold standard. The be-
havior of the three central rates in turn greatly influenced
that of the subsidiary foreign exchange triangles, especially in
Cf. Ch. TheTriangle in Unbalancedand without a Point of
Reference for Future Stabilization.1064 DISINTEGRATION
cases in which the advantages of stability in the currency of
one of the three center countries seemed to outweigh the ad-
vantages of finding some intermediate but fluctuating position
with reference to them all. It was this infinitely complex in-
terrelation of the world's exchange rates that divided the
former international gold standard world into currency
groups and determined the mutual relations of the groups.
This division entailed many forms of attack and defense in
the world's effort to shift economic burdens, allocate the real
costs of past mistakes, and achieve some sort of new economic
balance.
In the course of this struggle the influence of the sterling-
dollar rate as the great trunk line of the world's exchanges
gradually became more and more dominant, while the special
importance of the dollar-sterling-franc triangle waned as the
peculiar pull of the franc over the world's exchanges began to
disappear. In the course of this struggle also the world passed,
in very large measure, from a system of international trade
carried on under general tariff regulations embodying the
most favored nation principle into a system of regulated trade.
The general principles of protection were replaced by restric-
tions primarily designed to force an adjustment in balances of
payments where the traditional means of cyclical adjustment
under the gold standard had clearly broken down. An internal
conflict was waged in many countries between the interest of
producers subject to intensified foreign competition and the
interest of creditors on international account, and also be-
tween public and private creditors on international account.
In the debtor countries fierce conflicts arose as to priority in
the use of available foreign exchange for the maintenance of
public and private credit abroad and the provision of im-
ported goods to serve the needs of the domestic economy.
These conflicts in many cases led to far reaching regulation of
economic life. Since international capital movements had
proved incapable of fulfilling their time-bridging functions a
balance had to be achieved by altering the course of trade byNATURE THE DISINTEGRATION 1065
anyand all means that could be devised. This process may be
called 'forcing a balance on the world's books.'
Forcing a Balance on the World's Books
In its World Economic Survey, '9F/3 the League of Nations
Economic Section summarized this evolution toward a regu-
lated trade. Concerning the general course of tariff legislation
it wrote (pp. 193—4):
"Theperiod of tariff warfare which was renewed after a tem-
porary lull at the time of the World Economic Conference I
1927 culminated in the United States tariff of 1930, and the new
British tariff of 1931—32;butthese events were merely the out-
standing examples of a widespread tendency. It is, indeed, diffi-
cult to summarise with accuracy the many tariff increases that
have recently been imposed, to say nothing of... emergency
trade restrictions.... TheHawley-Smoot tariff in the United
States was the signal for an outburst of tariff-making activity in
other countries, partly at least by way of reprisals. Extensive in-
creases in duties were made almost immediately by Canada, Cuba,
Mexico, France, Italy, Spain. During 1931,generaltariff increases
were announced by India, Peru, Argentine, Brazil, China, Italy,
Lithuania. In addition, there were increases of duties upon indi-
vidual items or groups of commodities in most of the countries
for which information is available, often on several occasions.
When currency instability on a wide scale was unloosed after the
United Kingdom abandoned the gold standard in September
1931, tariffincreases, like other restrictions on trade, began to
follow one another in the most rapid succession. During 1932,
there were general tariff increases in the United Kingdom, Egypt,
Norway, Japan, Portugal, Greece, Siam, South Africa, Australia,
Belgium, Latvia, the Netherlands, the Dutch East Indies, Nica-
ragua, Persia and Venezuela. Partial increases, repeated several
times in most cases, were recorded in practically every country for
which information is available. There were some downward ad-
justments of particular items, but the general trend towards in-
crease was very clear. There was probably never any period when
trade was subject to such widespread and frequent alterations of
tariff barriers. The tariff warfare naturally fed on itself and hasio66 DISINTEGRATION
continued to do so as duties have been de-consolidated, treaties
have been denounced or allowed to expire. Currency instability
has led into a maze of new protectionist regulations and private
trading initiative generally has given way to administrative con-
trols."
Supplementing this tariff war a widespread system of emer-
gency measures of trade restriction grew up in 1931and1932,
based upon direct limitation of imports and, less frequently,
of exports. This the League of Nations Survey characterized
as "the new protection" (pp. 197—9)
"The first and simplest device employed as a supplement to
higher tariffs consists usually of a system by which imports are
prohibited except under license and therefore become possible
only after permission has previously been obtained from the ad-
ministrative authorities. While in some cases such licensing has
not gone far beyond the registering and surveillance of import
tendencies, in the majority of countries it has been accompanied
by, or has led to, measures of direct control and limitation of the
quantities imported. The varieties of procedure by which this
result has been achieved are many; but in essence they derive
from the principle of prohibiting imports either wholly or par-
tially in the case of certain specified products. Quota or con-
tingent systems are a variant of the method of prohibition, under
which only a stated quantity of specified imports is permitted.
There are many differences, even within the same country, in the
methods by which quota systems are administered. The fixing of
the quota, both in time and among the exporting countries and
the particular importers in each country, the surveillance of the
system by Government departments, by the associated importers,
by a grouping of exporters or by various combinations of these
methods, and the manner in which the quotas are varied from
time to time have developed according to the particular circum-
stances of the trades in question.
A more generalised control of imports is maintained in a great
number of countries in the form of foreign-exchange control. The
Central Bank is given power to impound the foreign exchange
derived from export receipts. In the majority of cases, provisionNATURE OF THE DISINTEGRATION 1067
is made whereby payments for exports must be deposited with the
Central Bank, which is also given power to mobilise as far as pos-
sible exchange derived from other sources. Payment for imports
is thereafter possible, theoretically, only by obtaining the requi-
site foreign currencies from the Central Bank, which is, therefore,
able to control the external drain upon its reserves and maintain
the external parity of the country's money. In practice, the effec-
tiveness of such foreign-exchange controls varies a good deal with
the economic circumstances of the particular countries. In some,
the invisible items in the balance of payments are so important,
and the powers of the Central Bank so limited, that 'black' mar-
kets quickly develop in which the national currency exchanges at
depreciated levels. While, however, the Central Banks are not
always able to exercise a fully effective control over their ex-
change rates and therefore over the quantities of goods imported,
the existence of such controls in so many countries has been a
powerful factor in compressing the total quantities and values of
imports and therefore of exports.
Such direct controls either over the quantities of goods im-
ported or over the means of paying for them are supplemented by
a variety of administrative devices which limit importation di-
rectly. Prominent among these are new types of sumptuary laws,
of which the most important are milling or mixing regulations
stipulating that, in the processes of manufacture, certain propor-
tions of domestic products must be combined with the imported
goods. Devised at least partly as a means to protect the secondary
manufacturing processes, such as flour-milling, these regulations
offer an effective check also to the use of imported raw materials
and therefore to the quantities imported. The raising of consular,
import and other administrative fees, the increasing severity of
legislation requiring marks of origin, the indirect effect of veteri-
nary or similar health regulations, and, in general, the consider-
able growth of administrative protectionism, add their influence
to other forms of restriction."
This new protection led inevitably to the growth of clear-
ing and barter agreements in which the ancient bullionist
principle of the balance of bargains once more made its ap-io68 DISINTEGRATION
pearance upon the world stage. This aspect of the disinte-
gration of world trade is described by the Survey (pp. 200—1)
asfollows:
"Mention should be made finally of the very rapid increase dur-
ing 1932ofthe various forms of clearing or compensation agree-
ments, both public and private. The latter, which are sometimes
described as truck or barter agreements, are a strange phenome-
non in the modern age, symptomatic of the extent to which the
normal media of exchange have broken down. The difficulty of
devising means of payment for trade conducted in the normal
fashion by the use of credit has led to agreements, between State
organisations or private enterprises, for the bartering of goods
against goods. Thus, the Turkish Ministry of Economy and an
Austrian tobacco company entered into an arrangement on No-
vember 17th, 1932,bywhich the company agreed to buy, up to
the end of June 1933,Turkishtobacco to the value of twenty
million French francs, payable in Austrian merchandise. The
Swedish Government made a similar arrangement with Greece to
import Greek tobacco to the value of $400,000,20 percent of
which sum was to be written off the Greek debts in Sweden, the
remaining 8o per cent being paid for in Swedish goods. Other ex-
amples are the compensation agreement between Hungary and
Czechoslovakia of December 22nd,• 1932,bywhich 29,000Hun-
garian pigs are to be exchanged for 20,000wagonsof Czecho-
slovak wood fuel, and Hungarian eggs and similar products to
the value of one and a-half million crowns are to be paid for by
facilities accorded to Hungarian tourists in the Czechoslovak
thermal stations. Similar barter agreements might be cited be-
tween European and also between South and North American
countries. For example, in August 1931,theBrazilian Govern-
ment concluded an agreement with the Grain Stabilization Cor-
poration and the Bush Terminal Company of New York for the
exchange during eighteen months of 1,275,000sacksof coffee
against 25,000,000bushelsof wheat. In consequence of this agree-
ment, Brazil prohibited the import of wheat flour for eighteen
months.
Clearing agreements, designed to regulate bilateral trade with
individual countries so as to decrease passive balances and bring